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GORSUCH’S PURGATORY: ATTEMPTING TO
DEFINE DEBT COLLECTOR UNDER THE FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Matthew D. Haan*
INTRODUCTION
A whopping seventy million consumers in the United States are
the subjects of debt collection activities.1 As of March 2017, debt
collection was an $11.4 billion industry nationwide.2 Debt collection
affects almost one-third of American consumers, and almost threefourths of these consumers have two or more debts out for
collection.3 The majority of debts originate from credit or charge
cards.4 In a survey conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), nearly half of the consumers who were contacted
*
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. I owe a huge thanks to Professor
Emeritus Mark Budnitz for his help and feedback throughout the writing and editing process. To my
family—especially my parents and sister—thank you for your guidance, encouragement, wisdom,
laughs, and love before, during, and after law school. To my wife, Harriet, thank you for all of the
sacrifices you have made during law school and your unwavering love and support. Finally, thank you
to all of the members of the Georgia State University Law Review for the relentless hard work that went
into this Note and in general.
1. CFPB Survey Finds Over One-in-Four Consumers Contacted by Debt Collectors Feel
Threatened, CFPB (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-surveyfinds-over-one-four-consumers-contacted-debt-collectors-feel-threatened/ [https://perma.cc/P689-543F]
[hereinafter CFPB Survey].
2. CFPB, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 9 (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Fair-Debt-CollectionPractices-Act-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZFK-9G54] [hereinafter CFPB 2017]. The number
of consumers affected by debt collection has more than doubled in the past four years—in 2013, the
CFPB reported that thirty million consumers were subject to debt collection activities. CFPB, FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 2 (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_March_FDCPA_Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/77MX3N3D].
3. CFPB, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH DEBT COLLECTION: FINDINGS FROM THE CFPB’S
SURVEY
OF
CONSUMER
VIEWS
ON
DEBT,
at
5
(2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_Debt-Collection-Survey-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F99P-U3ZL]. The majority of consumers with more than one debt out for collection
are between thirty-five and forty-nine years old, but debt collection affects all age groups. Id. at 17.
4. Id. at 19. Student loans are the second most common type of debt reported with credit or charge
cards and student loans comprising nearly 75% of all reported debts. Id.
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about a debt by a debt collector indicated that they requested that the
debt collector stop contacting them.5 Three-fourths of consumers in
this group reported that the debt collector did not honor their
requests.6 The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
makes it illegal for debt collectors to use certain tactics and contact
debtors at certain times and places and provides opportunities for
harmed consumers to seek redress.7 The FDCPA, a strict liability
statute, creates a private right of action that allows consumers to
collect up to $1,000 in statutory damages if they can prove that the
debt collector did not collect, or attempt to collect, the debts in
accordance with the statute.8
In June 2017, the Supreme Court’s decision in Henson v.
Santander Consumer USA, Inc. made it harder for consumers to seek
redress from certain entities when it definitively ruled that those who
purchase debt profiles and subsequently attempt to collect on them
are not debt collectors under the statute.9 The Court’s analysis
5. CFPB Survey, supra note 1.
6. Id. The CFPB also reported that, in general, over 25% of consumers contacted about a debt felt
threatened. Id.
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012). The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, making any debt
collector who fails to comply with any section of the Act with respect to a consumer liable to that
consumer in an amount equal to:
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the
court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or (B) in the case of a class action,
(i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class
members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the
lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the
court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in
bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the
defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.
Id. However, the Act provides that a debt collector may not be liable if it can show “by a preponderance
of evidence that the violation was not intentional” and was the result of a bona fide error. Id. § 1692k(c).
8. See id. § 1692k. Black’s Law Dictionary defines strict liability as “[l]iability that does not
depend on proof of negligence or intent to do harm but that is based instead on a duty to compensate the
harms proximately caused by the activity or behavior subject to the liability rule.” Strict Liability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
9. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721–22 (2017). The unanimous
opinion was the first written by Justice Gorsuch. Ryan Lovelace, Neil Gorsuch Writes First Opinion as
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focused on one statutory definition of a debt collector as one who
collects debts “owed . . . another.”10 The Court reasoned that because
debt purchasers become the owners of these debts, they are
attempting to collect debts owed to themselves, not debts
“owed . . . another.”11 However, the Court addressed only one
definition of debt collector under the FDCPA, thus leaving
unanswered the question of whether debt purchasers are subject to
the other statutory definition of debt collector. Under the other
definition, a debt collector is one whose principal business purpose is
the collection of debt.12 This Note analyzes the legal ramifications of
the Supreme Court’s decision and proposes a solution that provides
clarity for consumers, debt collectors, and creditors.
Part I of this Note provides background on the FDCPA and the
federal agencies charged with its enforcement.13 Part I also provides
background on judicial analysis of the FDCPA before Henson v.
Santander and explains the nature of the Supreme Court’s decision.14
Part II analyzes the ramifications of Henson v. Santander for debtors
and debt purchasers.15 Part II also analyzes how the Supreme Court’s
decision can affect the CFPB.16 Part III proposes and discusses a
three-tiered solution that involves congressional and CFPB action
and discusses what would happen if Congress and the CFPB left the
solution up to the courts.17

Supreme
Court
Justice,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(June
12,
2017,
10:59
AM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/neil-gorsuch-writes-first-opinion-as-supreme-courtjustice/article/2625661 [https://perma.cc/CH8C-T9LT].
10. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721 (“[W]e begin, as we must, with a careful examination of the statutory
text.”).
11. Id.
12. Matthew Rosenkoff, Game, Set, but Not Match: Supreme Court’s Decision in Henson v.
Santander, 86 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 45, 48 (2017).
13. See discussion infra Part I.A–B.
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. Background
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 197718 in response to
congressional research that found evidence of abusive, deceptive, and
unfair debt collection practices.19 The Act’s main purposes are to (1)
eliminate abusive debt collection, (2) protect ethical debt collectors
from disadvantages, and (3) foster uniform consumer protection.20
The Act has been criticized for its lack of clarity,21 and disputes over
the intended scope of coverage for the FDCPA go back at least thirty
years.22
A. Who Does the FDCPA Cover?
The FDCPA is a broad statute,23 but in many respects it is also
narrow.24 The Act only covers debt collectors who are collecting
debts stemming from primarily personal consumer transactions.25
Congress intended for the FDCPA to apply only to debt collectors—
as opposed to banks and other financial product lenders—due to the
belief that financial product lenders were more likely to have
repeated contact with a consumer.26

18. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(b), (e) (2012); Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 174.
20. Jolina Cuaresma, Katherine Lamberth & Brent Yarborough, Do You Think Banks Are Debt
Collectors? The CFPB and the FTC Do, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2016, at 1.
21. Carmen H. Thomas, Graham R. Billings & Donna O. Tillis, Defining “Debt Collector” Under
the FDCPA: The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits Reject the Acquired-in-Default Test, 72 BUS. LAW. 487,
487 (2017).
22. See, e.g., Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
23. Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 174 (“The Court has repeatedly held that ‘[a]s remedial legislation, the
FDCPA must be broadly construed in order to give full effect to these purposes . . . .’”).
24. See Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 46.
25. Id.; see also FTC, DEBT COLLECTION 1 (2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0036debt-collection.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RDV-CHF5]. Even though the FDCPA does not cover debts
incurred for business or commercial purposes, a consumer can still be liable in his individual capacity
for business debts. Boosahda v. Providence Dane LLC, 462 F. App’x 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2012).
26. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 1. Congress thought that debt collectors have little to no
concern with a debtor’s perception of them because, often, debt collectors do not have contact with a
debtor after receiving payment. Id. However, banks and consumer lenders are more likely to have future
contact with consumers and therefore have an inherent reason not to engage in abusive behavior so that
they can protect their good will. Id.
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The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business
the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”27 Put another
way, a debt collector is bound to the provisions of the FDCPA if its
principal purpose of business is debt collection or if they regularly
collect debts owed to another entity.28
B. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Before 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) served as the
enforcing body of the FDCPA, and in many respects the Commission
still has enforcement power.29 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), among other things,
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). The statute excludes from the definition:
(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor,
collecting debts for such creditor; (B) any person while acting as a debt collector
for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated
by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for
persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such
person is not the collection of debts; (C) any officer or employee of the United
States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt
is in the performance of his official duties; (D) any person while serving or
attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the
judicial enforcement of any debt; (E) any nonprofit organization which, at the
request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists
consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such
consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and (F) any person
collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed
or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary
obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was
originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the
time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such
person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the
creditor.
Id. § 1692a(6)(A)–(F).
28. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 487–88.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2012) (“The Federal Trade Commission shall be authorized to enforce
compliance with this subchapter, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed
under this subchapter is specifically committed to another Government agency . . . .”). Generally, the
FTC seeks to prevent persons and businesses, with some statutory exceptions, from engaging in unfair
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices that affect interstate commerce. Id. § 45(a)(2).
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created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as part of
the sweeping financial reforms in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis.30 Dodd-Frank amended the FDCPA to add the Bureau to the
list of agencies with the power to enforce the Act.31 The CFPB
oversees federal laws that protect financial-products consumers from
unfair, abusive, and deceptive acts or practices.32 It is the only
consumer-focused regulatory agency, consolidating the shared power
of several agencies within the federal government.33 The CFPB and
the FTC share enforcement authority of the FDCPA,34 but from a
practical standpoint the CFPB assumes a large role over enforcing the
FDCPA and other debt collection laws.35 Since Congress established
the CFPB six years ago, the agency has enjoyed success in its
consumer protection goals, returning billions of dollars to consumers
through enforcement actions.36 However, the Supreme Court dealt a
30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011,
124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012)).
31. Id. § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092 (codified as amended as 15 U.S.C. § 1692l (2012)) (“The Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.) is amended . . . by striking ‘Commission’ each
place that the term appears and inserting ‘Bureau’ . . . . The term ‘Bureau’ means the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection.”). Until Dodd-Frank created the CFPB, no agency had the authority to
issue regulations with respect to the FDCPA. CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR DEBT
COLLECTOR AND DEBT BUYER RULEMAKING: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND
ALTERNATIVES
CONSIDERED
2
(2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YR7H-TZL3].
32. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012).
33. Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why We Need a Consumer
Watchdog,
OBAMA
WHITE
HOUSE:
BLOG
(Jan.
4,
2012,
11:13
AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-whywe-need-consumer-watchdog#What is CFPB [https://perma.cc/54S5-RYAR]. Before the CFPB, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development shared consumer financial protection responsibilities.
Matt Gunn, What’s Getting Consolidated Under the CFPB?, BANK SYS. & TECH. (Mar. 23, 2011, 12:25
PM),
http://www.banktech.com/compliance/whats-getting-consolidated-under-the-cfpb/d/did/1294592.html [ https://perma.cc/T6ZW-CG4J].
34. See generally CFPB 2017, supra note 2, at 8 (“The CFPB and the FTC work closely to
coordinate debt collection enforcement actions among other matters related to debt collection.”). From a
practical standpoint, the CFPB assumes a large role over enforcing the FDCPA and other debt collection
laws.
35. Evan Dix, Dazed and Confused: The Need for Clarity in Dodd-Frank’s Abusive Standard, 47
STETSON L. REV. 185, 211 (2017).
36. C. Ryan Barber, The CFPB, Often a Winner in Court, Hit a Rough Patch this Summer, NAT’L
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significant blow to the regulatory agency when it announced that debt
purchasers do not qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA.37 The
decision severely limits the reach of the FDCPA and, given the recent
uncertainty surrounding the CFPB, creates new questions about the
CFPB’s future role in enforcing consumer protection laws.38
C. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.
Prior to Henson v. Santander, most courts that addressed the
default status of an acquired debt held that the terms “creditor” and
“debt collector” were mutually exclusive, meaning that an entity can
L.J. (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:13 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202798320034
[https://perma.cc/U5E5-Q6P7]; Standing up for You, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
[https://perma.cc/K8DD-MHMT] (last updated June 4, 2018) (claiming to hold companies accountable
for “$12.4 billion in relief to consumers through [CFPB’s] enforcement actions”). These enforcement
actions include filing actions in federal district court and initiating administrative adjudication
proceedings.
Enforcement
Actions,
CFPB,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/enforcement/actions/ [https://perma.cc/U8S9-AGA7] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). The CFPB
uses these tactics to effectuate its goals of making consumer finance rules more effective, consistently
enforcing those rules, and empowering consumers to take more control over their economic lives.
Strategy, Budget and Performance, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/budget-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/9WT8-RQ25] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
37. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721–22 (2017).
38. E.g., C. Ryan Barber, CFPB Lawyers: Trumped?, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 27, 2017, at 6. Barber’s
article quotes one lawyer who, in court, recently referred to the CFPB as the “‘800-pound gorilla in the
regulatory room.’” Id. In addition, Republican nominee Donald Trump vowed to dismantle the CFPB as
part of his campaign platform. Id. His transition team reaffirmed this position after the election, stating
Trump’s belief that the agency’s mandates “‘do[] not work for working people.’” C. Ryan Barber,
Trump Aims at Dodd-Frank, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2016, at 6. The distaste toward the CFPB gained
support in the courts in October 2016 when the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that the President should be able to remove the CFPB’s Director, reasoning that
the agency’s structure was unconstitutional. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
reh’g en banc granted, vacated (Feb. 16, 2017) (explaining that an independent agency headed by a
single director who is removable by the President only for cause violated Article II of the Constitution);
C. Ryan Barber, Riders on the CFPB Storm, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 9, 2017, at 1 [hereinafter Barber, Riders on
the CFPB Storm]. The D.C. Circuit’s ruling caused several companies, seeking to escape the agency’s
grasp, to cite the opinion in court. Barber, Riders on the CFPB Storm, supra, at 1. The CFPB’s structure
is not the only constitutional challenge to the agency. See William Simpson, Above Reproach: How the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 343, 353 (2016). The agency’s budget comes directly from the Federal Reserve, not the
Appropriations Committee, making the agency’s budget exempt from Congressional review. Id. at 345,
353. In Atlanta, District Judge Richard Story sanctioned the CFPB in August 2017 because he felt the
agency showed disregard for judicial instructions during the discovery process. R. Robin McDonald,
Judge Sanctions Federal Consumer Bureau in Collections Case, DAILY REPORT, Aug. 30, 2017, at 1.
The dismissal came after Judge Story issued an injunction earlier in 2015 that froze the assets of the
individual defendants and their business operations. Id.

Published by Reading Room,

7

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5

440

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

be either a creditor or debt collector under the statute, but not both.39
Determination of an entity’s status depended on the status of the debt
sought for collection: If the debt was in default, the entity was a debt
collector, and if the debt was not in default, the entity was a
creditor.40 The distinction between creditor and debt collector is
important because creditors are not liable for the actions of thirdparty debt collectors under the FDCPA.41 But a debt collector can be
vicariously liable for the actions of those seeking to collect a debt on
its behalf.42 Following the lead of the Eleventh Circuit in Davidson v.
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., the Fourth Circuit departed from this
dichotomous school of thought and laid the foundation for the
Supreme Court’s review of the newly-created circuit split.43
The facts setting the stage for Henson v. Santander are not unique:
Four Maryland consumers each signed a retail sales contract with
CitiFinancial Auto (CitiFinancial) to finance an automobile
purchase.44 When the plaintiffs stopped making payments and
defaulted on the contract, CitiFinancial repossessed the cars and
informed each plaintiff of its intention to pursue a deficiency
judgment.45 CitiFinancial later sold the plaintiffs’ defaulted debts as
part of a large debt portfolio to Santander Consumer USA
(Santander).46 After Santander began contacting the plaintiffs in an

39. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 488. The FDCPA defines a creditor as “any person who offers or
extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (2012). The term does
not include “any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default
solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.” Id.
40. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 488.
41. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 46; see also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d
131, 136–37 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017).
42. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 46.
43. Henson, 817 F.3d at 135–36 (explaining that the FDCPA “purports to regulate only the conduct
of debt collectors, not creditors,” and debt collectors collect debt on behalf of a creditor, whereas
creditors are those to which a debt is owed, so when a creditor seeks to collect its own debts, it is not
acting as a debt collector); Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.
2015). With their decisions, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits split from rulings in the Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, which previously adopted the “mutually exclusive” approach. Cuaresma et al., supra
note 20, at 3.
44. Henson, 817 F.3d at 134.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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effort to collect on the debts, the plaintiffs filed an action alleging
that Santander violated the FDCPA in both the pursuit of the
collection and the manner of pursuit.47 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the defaulted status of a debt “has no bearing
on whether a person qualifies as a debt collector under the threshold
definition set forth in [the statute].”48
On appeal, the Supreme Court sought to answer whether the
FDCPA treats a debt purchaser in this kind of scenario “more like the
repo man or the loan originator.”49 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
found the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning compelling and held that
purchasers of defaulted debt do not trigger the statutory definition of
a debt collector when they collect debts for themselves,50 focusing
the majority of its time on a grammatical analysis of the word
“another.”51
One thing is for certain following Henson v. Santander: consumers
and their attorneys can no longer assert that a debt purchaser is a debt
collector subject to the FDCPA simply by showing that the debt was
in default at the time of acquisition.52 However, it remains to be seen
whether a debt purchaser of defaulted accounts can be, and will be,
classified as a debt collector through a different manner.53 After all,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it was not addressing the

47. Id. In order to meet FDCPA requirements that a plaintiff properly allege that the defendant is a
debt collector, the Henson plaintiffs alleged that Santander purchases defaulted consumer debts for
pennies on the dollar as part of its business. Id. The plaintiffs argued further:
The terms “debt collector” and “creditor” are mutually exclusive under the
FDCPA. An entity can be either a “debt collector” or a “creditor” in any
particular transaction. The determining factor of whether an entity is a “debt
collector” or “creditor” in any particular transaction when the entity in question
is not the originating lender is whether the debt was acquired prior to default or
after default. Since Santander acquired [the plaintiffs’] debts from the original
lender well after each [plaintiff] defaulted on their debt, Santander’s collection
activities on these defaulted debts make[] it a “debt collector.”
Id. at 135.
48. Henson, 817 F.3d at 135.
49. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017).
50. Id. at 1721–22.
51. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 47.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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meaning and application of the other definition of debt collector that
focuses on the principal business purpose.54 Although the Supreme
Court focused almost entirely on a grammatical analysis of
“another,” a distinction or restriction does not exist for the principal
purpose definition.55 Moreover, much of the FDCPA litigation has
not focused on the principal business purpose prong, making
potential arguments harder for consumer attorneys.56 The Supreme
Court does not seem likely to address the principal business purpose
argument any time soon, if ever.57 Questions about an institution like
Santander claiming its primary business purpose to be loan
origination, and not the purchase of defaulted debt, surely exist, but
the Court did not provide definite answers to those questions or any
related ones.58 Although the Court applauded both sides for
presenting strong arguments on the questions not litigated, it believed
that the existence of the arguments suggests one likely consequence:
the matters not addressed in the opinion are matters for Congress to
resolve, not the Supreme Court.59 This does not mean that lower
courts will avoid the question; at least one court has held that the
presence of the definite article “the” indicates that Congress intended
for a business to have only one principal (or primary) purpose.60 Just
54. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721. Although the court acknowledged the principal purpose prong of the
statutory definitions, it explained:
[T]he parties briefly allude to another statutory definition of the term “debt
collector”–one that encompasses those engaged “in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts.” § 1692a(6). But the parties
haven’t much litigated that alternative definition and in granting certiorari we
didn’t agree to address it either.
Id.
55. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48.
56. Id.
57. See Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725.
58. Id.
59. Id. This, obviously, is not set in stone. With the Senate confirming Justice Kavanaugh to the
Court and two sitting Justices at least eighty years old, the Supreme Court could drastically change in a
relatively short amount of time. Newly-confirmed Justice Kavanaugh wrote a lengthy dissent in the
rehearing of PHH v. CFPB in which he argued that the CFPB is unconstitutional because it is the only
independent agency whose “head” is not accountable to a commission or board. PHH Corp. v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
60. Hunte v. Safeguard Props. Mgmt., LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 722, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The pertinent
portion of § 1692a(6) defines ‘debt collector’ as an entity ‘the principal purpose of which is the
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as Henson v. Santander definitively answered the question of the
status of a purchaser of defaulted debts, it posed an equally important
question about a debt purchaser’s principal business purpose.61
II. Analysis
Henson v. Santander created a near-ironclad defense for debt
purchasers named in FDCPA lawsuits.62 Among other requirements,
a plaintiff’s FDCPA claim must contain enough facts to establish that
the defendant attempting to collect the debt meets the statutory
definition of a debt collector.63 Even if a defendant qualified as a debt
collector under the statute, it could succeed on a motion to dismiss if
the plaintiff’s complaint did not properly allege that the defendant
was a debt collector.64 Henson v. Santander makes it probable that a
debt purchaser will successfully move to dismiss FDCPA claims
filed against it simply by citing Henson v. Santander even if the debt
purchaser engaged in egregious misconduct, and the complaint
properly alleges that the defendant has violated the Act and made the
plaintiff the object of collection activity. Although Henson v.
Santander provided debt purchasers with a new argument in a motion
to dismiss, the debt purchasers face another challenge: how will
courts address and resolve the assertion that a debt purchaser’s
principal business purpose is the collection of debt?65 Further,
debtor-plaintiffs could face additional hurdles in the courts.

enforcement of security interests.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). Not ‘a principal purpose of
which,’ but ‘the principal purpose of which.’”).
61. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48.
62. See id.
63. Frazier v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2011). A
plaintiff must also establish that: (1) “she has been the object of collection activity arising from a
consumer debt;” and (2) “the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a
requirement imposed by the FDCPA.” Id.
64. E.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531, 537 (D. Md. 2013)
(granting defendants’ motions to dismiss because plaintiff’s complaint did not demonstrate that
defendants were debt collectors).
65. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48.
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A. The Principal Purpose Prong
Before Henson v. Santander, a company could acquire defaulted
debts while having a principal business purpose of collecting those
debts and, technically, fall into the FDCPA’s creditor and debt
collector classifications at the same time.66 The Supreme Court stated
that the status of the debt is irrelevant because the only inquiry that
matters is whether the debt owner “seeks to collect debts for its own
account or does so for ‘another.’”67 With the new standard, it does
not matter how the debt owner became the debt owner—whether
through origination or subsequent purchase.68
1. A New Kind of Mutual Exclusivity
At least for the “owed . . . another” prong, Henson v. Santander
renders the previous circuit split about mutual exclusivity for the
acquisition of defaulted debt irrelevant. However, in jurisdictions that
previously used the mutual exclusivity approach, Henson v.
Santander may have a more severe impact on debt collection than in
jurisdictions that held the determination of creditor versus debt
collector is not mutually exclusive. In jurisdictions that applied
mutual exclusivity, a strong argument exists that Henson v.
Santander eliminates the principal business purpose argument.69 As
explained earlier, in those jurisdictions an entity is either a creditor or
a debt collector.70 Because Henson v. Santander classifies debt
purchasers collecting their own debts as creditors, the mutual
exclusivity approach would permanently classify these entities as
creditors as long as the debt subject to dispute or litigation is one that
the entity purchased for itself. The Court seems to adopt its own
version of mutual exclusivity with respect to the collection efforts for

66. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2.
67. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017).
68. Id.
69. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48.
70. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 488. The CFPB and the FTC have also adopted the mutually
exclusive approach. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2.
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a single debt—the company either collects a debt owed to itself or
collects a debt owed to someone else.71
2. Problems with Asserting a Principal Purpose Argument
Historically, it has been easier for consumer attorneys to prove the
defaulted status of a debt rather than the principal business purpose
of the debt collector.72 Now that the status of the debt essentially
does not matter, attorneys will have to present the principal purpose
argument in FDCPA lawsuits against debt purchasers, but it is not
clear how courts will address these arguments. Plaintiffs usually lack
sufficient information about a debt collector to assert enough facts to
prove an entity’s principal purpose is debt collection.73 This results in
conclusory statements and “threadbare allegations” that modern
courts do not accept.74
Some of the nation’s largest debt purchasers, seemingly, are at
least cognizant of the problems plaintiffs run into when attempting to
assert a principal purpose argument.75 Encore Capital Group (Encore)
is the nation’s largest debt buyer.76 The company’s “About Encore”
71. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1724. The Court explained that under the FDCPA, as written, an entity has
to attempt to collect a debt owed to another entity before the collecting entity can even qualify as a debt
collector. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). The presence of the conjunction “or” makes quite a
difference for interpreting the definition of a debt collector because, naturally, it means that an entity
cannot fall into more than one statutory definition. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 47. Additionally, the
Court points out that in other parts of the FDCPA’s definition section, Congress used “or” when it
wished to differentiate between originators of credit and purchasers of debt. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723.
Specifically, the statute differentiates between debts “originated by” a debt collector and debts owed to
someone else. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2012); Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723. The Court could not
ignore these distinctions, pointing out that when one engages in statutory interpretation, there is a strong
presumption that differences in language like the ones discussed above tend to convey differences in
meaning. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723.
72. Rosenkoff, supra note 12, at 48.
73. E.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 532 (D. Md. 2013)
(“Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint falls short of alleging that debt collection is the primary purpose of
[the defendant’s] business.”).
74. Id.
75. About Cavalry, CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVS., http://www.cavalryportfolioservices.com/about
[https://perma.cc/FMB3-EEA8] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); Our Mission, ENCORE CAPITAL GRP.,
https://www.encorecapital.com/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/DY7D-4VT3] (last visited Oct. 16,
2018); Who is MCM?, MIDLAND CREDIT MGMT., INC., https://www.midlandcreditonline.com/who-ismcm/midland-funding-llc/ [https://perma.cc/8NTM-L2D4] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
76. CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect
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page on its website indicates that its subsidiaries “purchase portfolios
of consumer receivables from major banks, credit unions, utility
providers, and municipalities[] and partner with individuals as they
repay their obligations and work toward financial recovery.”77 The
statement indicates that Encore’s principal business purpose is debt
collection, but the company’s mission statement creates some
ambiguity.78 Encore states that its mission is to “help people recover
from financial difficulty and turn toward a path of economic
empowerment.”79 The conflicting statements on Encore’s website
represent conflicting facts for attorneys seeking to make the principal
business purpose argument.
A consumer attorney would likely read the mission statement to
mean that Encore’s principal business purpose is debt collection, but
Encore would likely insist that its principal business purpose is to
provide financial recovery assistance.80 An inquiry into one of
Encore’s largest subsidiaries, Midland Credit Management, yields
similar results. Midland Credit states that it “is dedicated to helping
consumers find their way back to financial stability and relieve the
emotional stress that can accompany unpaid debt.”81 The debate
Bad Debts, CFPB (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takesaction-against-the-two-largest-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/
[https://perma.cc/3LN8-GWSP]. In its suit against Encore Capital Group, the CFPB alleged that the
company purchased debts without confirming their validity and pressured consumers into payments.
Yuka Hayashi, CFPB Settles with Debt-Collection Giants, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:14 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-settles-with-debt-collection-giants-1441829640
[https://perma.cc/JAL4-SLBA]. Encore and the CFPB reached an agreement in which the company
agreed to pay a $10 million fine and repay $42 million to consumers. Id.
77. About
Encore,
ENCORE
CAPITAL
GRP.,
https://www.encorecapital.com/about
[https://perma.cc/9XQY-ASPX] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). Although it does not seem like an important
distinction, it is interesting to note that Encore Capital Group states that “[its] subsidiaries,” not Encore
itself, purchase consumer debt. Id.
78. Id.; ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 75. The ambiguity exists in trying to decipher the
conflicting statements that indicate Encore’s principal business purpose is debt collection while
simultaneously identifying its goal (e.g., its business purpose) is to help consumers recover from
financial hardship. ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 75.
79. ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. MIDLAND CREDIT MGMT., supra note 75. Language like this appears to be the industry standard.
See id.; CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVS., supra note 75. Cavalry Portfolio Services, another of the nation’s
largest debt purchasers, describes its “commitment to resolving each customer’s financial situation” and
ability to “work with customers to identify solutions that improve their financial fitness.” CAVALRY
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about a debt buyer’s principal business purpose could focus on
mission statements and pledges found on a company’s website.
However, the more pressing issue for consumers is whether courts
will accept these statements as sufficient proof of the company’s
principal business purpose being the collection of debt.82 Federal
courts have dismissed FDCPA claims in the past when the plaintiff
made conclusory allegations about the nature of a debt collector’s
business.83 It remains to be seen how a court will characterize
statements like those described above in an assertion about a
defendant’s principal business purpose; it also remains to be seen
whether a court will afford deference to those statements.84
B. Debt Purchasers Are Not Completely Out of the Woods
The Supreme Court concluded that a debt purchaser collecting its
own debts is more akin to a creditor, exempting it from the FDCPA.85
However, exemption from FDCPA liability does not give debt
purchasers “carte blanche” to engage in whatever conduct they
choose, nor does it preclude them from facing liability for
misconduct stemming from other laws.86 Laws exist in all fifty states
that provide protection for consumers by prohibiting unfair,
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices (commonly called UDAP
statutes).87 However, a glaring lack of uniformity exists among these
PORTFOLIO SERVS., supra note 75.
82. E.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530 (D. Md. 2013) (reasoning that
the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant regularly collected debts on behalf of another entity
because the complaint only contained a conclusion that the defendant collected such debts and did not
include sufficient evidence to support the claim).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 532 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
85. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017). A creditor becomes
subject to the FDCPA as a debt collector only if, “in the process of collecting [its] own debts,” it “uses
any name other than [its] own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to
collect such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012).
86. The FDCPA is not the only law that applies to financial misconduct. See 12
U.S.C. § 5563(a)(1)(B) (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or
practice. Id. The CFPB may act to enforce this statute, but the statute does not create a private right of
action. Beider v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 465, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
87. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5 (Feb.
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state laws.88 On one hand, some laws, like California’s Rosenthal
Act, “mimic[] or incorporate[] by reference the FDCPA’s
requirements,” including available remedies for misconduct.89 On the
other hand, some laws, like Georgia’s Industrial Loan Act, only
apply to entities that provide loans less than $3,000.90 State-level
consumer protection laws can be effective, but the inconsistencies
from state to state, when coupled with the limits placed on federal
law by Henson v. Santander, have the potential to limit a consumer’s
available remedies just by virtue of the state he lives in.
1. Vicarious Liability
The requisite for imposing vicarious liability under the FDCPA
also hinges on whether an entity is a debt collector or a creditor.91 For
the most part, when a company qualifies as a debt collector under the
FDCPA, courts have found the company liable for FDCPA violations
committed by its third-party attorneys.92 However, when the
2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XDF9N2]. Although Carter published this source in 2009, before the passage of The Dodd-Frank Act and
the creation of the CFPB, the FDCPA had been in effect for over thirty years. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at
1 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1695.
88. See CARTER, supra note 87, at 5. As of 2009, the states varied greatly in the scope of UDAP
statutes. See id. at 7–10. Some states, like Rhode Island, had statutes that provided strong consumer
protection for post-sales acts but provided weak protection for credit, insurance, utilities, and real estate,
whereas other states, like Nevada, had statutes that provided strong protection in each of these types of
transactions. Id. at 9.
89. Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). The Rosenthal Act provides
that all debt collectors must comply with Sections 1692b through 1692j of the FDCPA and states further
that debt collectors are subject to the remedies found in Section 1692k of the FDCPA. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1788.17 (West 2017). There are even more inconsistencies, however, as the Rosenthal Act
references the incorporated federal sections “as they read” on January 1, 2001. Id. A 2006 amendment to
the FDCPA states that “[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be
treated as an initial communication” for the purposes of triggering certain action upon a debt collector’s
initial communication with a debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(d) (2012). This inconsistency is beyond the
scope of this Note, but it illustrates another issue with debt collection.
90. O.C.G.A. § 7-3-4 (2015).
91. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 600 (2010) (stating
that some courts have held clients vicariously liable for their lawyer’s violations of the FDCPA).
92. E.g., Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 567, 584–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Courts have previously held that principals or corporate parents can be vicariously liable for their
agents’ or subsidiaries’ FDCPA violations when the principals are themselves debt collectors. Id.
Conversely, attorneys are generally not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their debt collectorclients. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006).
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company is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, some courts have
refused to impose vicarious liability for the actions of its attorneys.93
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
provided the rationale for this theory:
A debt collector should not be able to hire an attorney to
engage in illegal debt collection practices on its behalf as a
means of avoiding liability under the FDCPA. On the other
hand, if the client is not a debt collector subject to liability
under the FDCPA itself, then its decision to hire an
attorney to engage in debt collection practices on its behalf
would not be predicated on evading FDCPA liability, and
imputing liability under those circumstances would not
further the interests of the Act.94
The disagreements between courts about when a debt collector or
creditor should be vicariously liable for its agent’s FDCPA violations
could gain more traction soon.95 Not only are circuit courts split on
the appropriate test, but certain district courts within some circuits do
not agree on how to determine vicarious liability under the FDCPA.96
Given the restrictions that Henson v. Santander imposed on a
consumer’s ability to seek redress, vicarious liability is just one

93. Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1996). But see Huy Thanh
Vo v. Nelson & Kennard, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6))
(holding that, even though subjecting creditors to vicarious liability will extend the FDCPA’s coverage
to “non-’debt collectors,’” doing so creates necessary “incentives for creditors to monitor their
attorneys’ compliance with fair debt collection laws” because attorneys acting as the creditor’s agent
“allow[s] the creditor to say, ‘I didn’t do it; my attorney did it,’” thus allowing “the creditor to collect
under ‘a name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to
collect such debts’”).
94. Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533 (D. Md. 2013).
95. Compare Polanco, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (concluding that, in accordance with the findings of
other courts in that circuit, “principals or corporate parents may be held vicariously liable for their
agents’ or subsidiaries’ actions that violated the FDCPA where the principals are themselves ‘debt
collectors’”), with Wadlington, 76 F.3d at 108 (“We do not think it would accord with the intent of
Congress . . . for a company that is not a debt collector to be held vicariously liable for a collection suit
that violates [the FDCPA] only because the filing attorney is a ‘debt collector.’”).
96. Polanco, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 585.
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theory of liability that courts may start to use to hold debt buyers
accountable for their actions.
2. The Uncertain Future of the CFPB
Growing opposition to the CFPB poses perhaps the greatest threat
to consumer protection on a federal level.97 As the FDCPA is
currently written, the FTC has the authority to enforce compliance
with the Act, but it does not have rulemaking authority.98 The CFPB
is the only government agency that has the authority to create rules
and regulations for debt collectors and the debt collection industry.99
If the CFPB is eventually ruled unconstitutional, the FTC would be
severely limited in its ability to enforce compliance with the FDCPA
because it would not have the authority to create new financial
protection rules that regulate creditor-debt buyers.100 In July 2016,
before Henson v. Santander reached the Supreme Court, the CFPB
released an Outline of Proposals Under Consideration and

97. See Barber, supra note 36. In addition to federal judges cracking down on the CFPB by
dismissing its claims and awarding significantly less damages, the agency also lost one of its longeststanding advocates in the United States Justice Department when he withdrew from all of the CFPB
enforcement cases assigned to him. C. Ryan Barber, The CFPB Is Losing a Trial Court Ally in the U.S.
Justice Department, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/09/thecfpb-is-losing-a-trial-court-ally-in-the-us-justice-department/ [https://perma.cc/4GF8-XXQ2] .
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2012).
99. Id. § 1692l(d).
100. Id. § 1692l(a). The main constitutional challenge to the CFPB is its structure as an independent
agency headed by a single director, rather than a multi-member board, who is removable by the
President only for good cause. Neil J. Kinkopf, Alternative Facts & History, and Alarming Implications,
in DOJ’s CFPB Brief, TAKE CARE BLOG (Apr. 17, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/alternativefacts-and-history-and-alarming-implications-in-doj-s-cfpb-brief [https://perma.cc/2ZNX-XSN7]. The
House of Representatives passed a bill, the CHOICE Act, that would replace the CFPB’s single director
with a bipartisan five-member commission that would subject the agency to congressional funding and
oversight. Megan Leonhardt, Buried in Trump’s Budget: A New Attempt to Kill a Powerful Consumer
Watchdog, TIME (May 23, 2017), http://time.com/money/4790486/trump-budget-2018-cuts-cfpbconsumers/ [https://perma.cc/XYD6-YRHP]. The House of Representatives passed the CHOICE Act by
a 233–186 vote. Donna Borak, House Votes to Kill Dodd-Frank. Now What?, CNN MONEY (June 8,
2017, 6:11 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/08/news/economy/house-dodd-frank-repeal/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8E6J-5544]. As of December 15, 2017, there was no reported action on the bill since
July 13, 2017, when the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing on
the bill. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
& Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Alternatives Considered (Outline).101 Pursuant to its rulemaking
authority, the CFPB released the outline as a response to
contradictory court decisions in various jurisdictions that have
resulted in different interpretations of the FDCPA.102 The CFPB
realized the significance of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling and announced
that it would consider using its rulemaking authority to issue rules
that “regulate unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices”
engaged in by not only debt collectors but also entities that fall
outside the FDCPA’s reach.103
The CFPB’s proposals would apply to collection agencies, debt
purchasers, debt collection law firms, and loan servicers.104 However,
many, if not all, of the proposals considered would require the debt
collector to take more steps in verifying the validity of the
information it receives from the debt owner.105 The CFPB asserts that
the proposed changes stem from its belief that debt collectors conduct
only a limited review of the information received from the debt
owner before starting collection activity.106 It is entirely possible,
however, that some within the CFPB saw internal confusion and
chaos, and feared that its ability to reach debt owners might expire.107
101. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 493.
102. CFPB, supra note 31, at 2. Despite the limitations to the CFPB’s authority created by Henson v.
Santander, the agency continues to push “for a narrow interpretation of the debt collector
definition . . . that enlarges its enforcement power over the debt collection industry.” Thomas et al.,
supra note 21, at 493.
103. Thomas et al., supra note 21, at 493. The Outline points out that the Dodd-Frank Act, which
created the CFPB, covers “creditors who are collecting or attempting to collect on debts that relate to a
consumer financial product or service.” CFPB, supra note 31, at 3.
104. CFPB, supra note 31, at 4. Specifically, the proposals would affect “small entities” in the
categories listed but would not have an impact on every small entity in every line of business. Id.
105. Id. at 8. The proposals under consideration would require debt collectors to review the
information contained in the debt portfolio to look for indications of uncertainty about the adequacy or
accuracy of the information for a particular debtor or for the portfolio information as a whole. Id.
106. Id.
107. Yuka Hayashi, White House Criticizes CFPB for Naming Own Temporary Chief, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 25, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-criticizes-cfpb-for-naming-owntemporary-chief-1511631996 [https://perma.cc/R6T6-P3L9]. The power struggle between the Trump
Administration and the CFPB intensified when CFPB Director Richard Cordray resigned from his
position without giving a reason for his departure. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB Head Cordray to Step down,
Paving Way for Change at Watchdog, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2017, 2:35 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-director-richard-cordray-to-step-down-1510766617
[https://perma.cc/LRD3-F9JR]. On his way out, Mr. Cordray, relying on language in the Dodd-Frank
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The CFPB wanted to do something to ensure that the collection of
these debts remain regulated. The CFPB could effectively regulate
debt purchasers by proposing additional requirements on the debt
collectors that service the purchased debt portfolios.108 However, the
Bureau will have to figure out its own internal power struggle before
it can make any progress on rulemaking.
III. Proposal
Consumer protection laws and financial regulations need to evolve
to reflect the large role that debt purchasers play in the debt
collection industry. Congress should provide clarity about the types
of entities that are subject to the requirements of the FDCPA.
Without adapted statutes and regulations that provide clarity, the
current state of the law requires debt purchasers to play a guessing
game that questions how vulnerable they might be to liability.
Similarly, millions of debtors have few options for seeking
compensation if they feel harmed by the actions of debt
purchasers.109

Act, named Deputy Director Leandra English as the interim director, but President Donald Trump used
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 to appoint Mick Mulvaney, the director of the White House
Office of Management and Budget, to the interim position. Miles Parks, Who’s in Charge? An Awkward
Monday Is Coming for This Federal Agency, NPR (Nov. 25, 2017, 5:40 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/25/566477507/whos-in-charge-an-awkward-mondayis-coming-for-consumer-financial-protection-bur?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
[https://perma.cc/QDV7-E84C]. Ms. English and Mr. Mulvaney jockeyed for position as acting director
on the Monday after Thanksgiving 2017 with Mr. Mulvaney arriving at the CFPB office with a bag full
of donuts and later meeting with top officials before holding a press conference, and Ms. English sent an
e-mail to employees saying that she is the director before meeting with Senate Democrats. Yuka
Hayashi & Lalita Clozel, Trump Asserts Control over Agency, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2017, at A1, A4.
108. CFPB, supra note 31, at 8. The proposal “address[es] attempts to shift responsibility for the
accuracy of information about debts in portfolios from debt owners to collectors.” Id. “As with the
fundamental information, collectors need not obtain the representation of accuracy [to] possess a
reasonable basis for claims of indebtedness, but they would have to justify an alternative approach.” Id.
109. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697. Part of
Congress’s reason for the FDCPA was that nearly forty percent of Americans had no legitimate way to
respond to debt collection abuse. Id. There was a glaring lack of state law at the time, with thirteen states
having no debt collection laws and another eleven states having laws that provided little to no
protection. Id. at 2–3.
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A. Option One: Statutory Clarity
Congressional amendment provides the best solution. In
concluding its opinion in Henson v. Santander, the Supreme Court
called on Congress to fix the problem, hinting that this is the favored
solution.110 There are certainly questions about whether institutions
like Santander are more likely to engage in abusive conduct when
they profess their principal business purpose to be lending rather than
debt purchasing.111 The Court did not offer any solutions or answers
to questions like this one but only provided that the answer is a
matter for Congress, not the Supreme Court.112
1. Limiting the Debt Collector Definition and Implementing
New Requirements
Congress could follow the Supreme Court’s lead and completely
exclude debt purchasers from the reach of the FDCPA and do
nothing to regulate them. However, this solution runs the risk of
returning a significant portion of debt collection activity to its preFDCPA state: debt collectors calling debtors at dinnertime, using
obscene and profane language, and threatening the use of violence
while attempting to collect debts.113
Congress could provide the most clarity by enacting an entirely
new statute that applies only to debt purchasers. This seems to be the
type of statute that the Supreme Court contemplates in the conclusion
of Henson v. Santander.114 In the process, Congress should amend
110. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1726 (2017) (“[T]he proper role of
the judiciary . . . [is] to apply, not amend, the work of the People’s representatives.”).
111. Id. at 1725.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1720; S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1. Before Congress enacted the FDCPA, the Consumer
Affairs Subcommittee held hearings that revealed that independent debt collectors caused the most
severe “suffering and anguish” on the debtors that they contact. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1–2. In addition
to the forms of abuse mentioned above, Congress reported that debt collectors frequently revealed a
consumer’s personal information to family members, friends, neighbors, and employers; the debt
collectors also obtained personal consumer information via pretending to be a public or government
official and imitating legal processes. Id. at 2.
114. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725 (“We have no difficulty imagining, for example, a statute that applies
the Act’s demands to anyone collecting any debts, anyone collecting debts originated by another, or to
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the FDCPA by eliminating the clause that defines a debt collector as
any entity having a principal business purpose of collecting debts.115
This would remove any confusion and speculation about an entity’s
principal business purpose, making it irrelevant to the debt collector
inquiry. Determining an entity’s principal business purpose could be
far too difficult.116 Thus, the FDCPA would only define a debt
collector as one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another.”117 The Supreme Court decided that debt purchasers are
not debt collectors, so they should not be subject to a statute that only
applies to debt collectors.118
This does not mean that debt purchasers would go completely
unregulated. A new statute should impose requirements on debt
purchasers at the time that they acquire a debt portfolio to ensure that
debt purchasers do not engage in discriminatory or abusive behavior.
Debt purchasers often obtain very little information about the debts
within a portfolio, sometimes receiving only a computerized
summary of the creditor’s business records.119 A new statute should
make debt purchasers directly liable for not verifying certain data
points before they either collect or attempt to collect the debt for
themselves or send it to a debt collection attorney to do so.120
Verifying account media, including monthly statements, charge off
dates, and recent payments for credit debts, as well as indicating the
presence of any recent complaints, would go a long way to ensure
that debt purchasers are not attempting to collect on bad debts.
Further, the new statute should be a strict liability statute, whose
imposed liability mimics those imposed under the FDCPA.121
some other class of persons still.”).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012).
116. See supra discussion Part II.A.2.
117. See supra discussion Part II.A.2.
118. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721–22.
119. ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION VOL. 1, 24 (9th ed. 2018).
120. The National Consumer Law Center points out that one of the largest problems with debt
purchasers is that companies selling debt portfolios do not guarantee the accuracy of the information
contained in a portfolio, but debt purchasers maintain that the information received is correct. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012); McCall v. Drive Fin. Servs., 440 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390 (E.D. Pa.
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2. New Requirements Benefit Debt Purchasers and Collection
Attorneys
Imposing liability for failing to meet the required verification
points would benefit the debt purchasers. By requiring debt
purchasers to verify information about the debts they receive from
creditors, debt purchasers will know that they are purchasing valid
debts.122 This would prevent debt purchasers from spending money
on a debt portfolio only to find that a significant portion of the
portfolio contains bad or expired debts.123
The benefits of the new requirements would improve the
efficiency of collection attorneys as well, should a debt purchaser
choose to use a law firm to attempt to collect its debts.124 First, by
imposing verification requirements on debt purchasers at the time of
debt portfolio acquisition, lawyers and law firms will be in a better
position to make appropriate decisions about each debt. Verification
from the debt purchaser will allow the collection attorneys to pursue
only valid debts, which would lower the chance that collection
attorneys will file a claim that eventually gets dismissed due to a
statute of limitations issue or a previous discharge in bankruptcy.
Second, as claims on bad debts decrease in frequency, the debt
collection law firms and their attorneys will become less vulnerable
to lawsuits defending FDCPA allegations, resulting in more time and
money spent on the lawful collection of debts.125
2006) (explaining that the maximum potential liability of debt collectors is $1,000 for an individual
plaintiff).
122. A result of the lack of information received by debt purchasers is the prevalence of debts already
settled, debts belonging to another person, or debts in the wrong amount. HOBBS ET AL., supra note 119,
at 25.
123. Id. at 13.
124. The law firms that collect debt for debt purchasers are, right now, subject to the FDCPA because
they collect debt “owed . . . another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). However, Michigan Congressman
David Trott proposed a bill, the Practice of Law Technical Clarification Act of 2017, that would amend
the FDCPA to exclude “law firms and licensed attorneys who are engaged in activities related to legal
proceedings from the definition of a debt collector,” thus making law firms exempt from the FDCPA.
Practice of Law Technical Clarification Act of 2017, H.R. 1849, 115th Cong. (2017). The proposed
legislation would also limit the CFPB’s power to reach attorneys acting in this manner. Id.
125. See Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Guided by
Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the FDCPA, we find that the Act applies to the
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Finally, the new requirements will continue to further the
FDCPA’s purpose.126 Debt collection law firms and lawyers that
adhere to the FDCPA should not have to face unfair competition
from law firms that intentionally commit prohibited acts or choose to
ignore the statute when attempting to collect debts. The verification
requirements for debt purchasers will effectively keep frequent
violators out of the debt collection market.
B. Option Two: CFPB Regulations for Debt Purchasers
The CFPB can provide a smaller-scale solution by issuing
regulations that apply to debt purchasers outside the reach of the
FDCPA. Just as the Supreme Court calls on Congress to provide
statutory clarity, the Court also seems to call on the CFPB to issue
regulations that reach debt purchasers.127 Pursuant to its rulemaking
authority, the CFPB can issue the specific requirements contemplated
in Option One.128 Even though debt purchasers are exempt from the
FDCPA, the CFPB would not be outside of its authority by regulating
debt purchasers because Dodd-Frank covers creditors who are
collecting or attempting to collect on debts that relate to a consumer
financial product or service.129 One of the CFPB’s practices in the
litigating activities of lawyers and law firms engaged in consumer debt collection, subject only to the
limited exceptions Congress has chosen to include in the statute.”).
126. Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2.
127. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725–26 (2017). The Court points
out that it is “hardly unknown for new business models to emerge in response to regulation and for
regulation in turn to address new business models.” Id. In this statement, the Court almost takes the
position of “you caused this problem, now it is your job to fix it.” See id.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) (2012); see also supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text.
129. CFPB, supra note 31, at 3. Under the proposed Financial CHOICE Act, the CFPB would become
the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency and have no control over its budget or the ability to pursue
unfair, abusive, and deceptive practices of financial services companies, but it is unclear whether the
Consumer Law Enforcement Agency would continue to have similar rulemaking authority possessed by
the CFPB. Erik Sherman, GOP Takes Aim at a Consumer Protection Agency and Post-Collapse Bank
Regulations,
FORBES.COM
(June
8,
2017,
6:31
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2017/06/08/gop-takes-aim-at-a-consumer-protection-agencyand-post-collapse-bank-regulations/#50274c5a4b24 [https://perma.cc/XLF7-QNLL]. The Financial
CHOICE Act would accordingly replace any reference to the CFPB within the FDCPA with references
to the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th
Cong. § 711 (2017).
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past has been imposing limits on future actions of debt collection law
firms as part of settlements reached between the Bureau and the law
firm.130 However, the CFPB should not regulate the practice of law
by enjoining law firms from filing collection lawsuits on behalf of
debt purchasers without attaching “a chronological listing of the
names of all the prior owners of the [d]ebt and the date of each
transfer of ownership of the [d]ebt.”131 Instead, the CFPB should
regulate the debt purchasers only by requiring each debt purchaser to
obtain information reflecting the opening of a debtor’s account and
any payments made to the account.
C. Option Three: Wait and See
Congress and the CFPB could always wait and see how courts will
interpret the practical implications of Henson v. Santander. An
interpretation is not likely to come from the Supreme Court given the
conclusion of its opinion.132 As noted above, the Court does not seem
inclined to answer any further questions about how the principal
purpose prong applies to a debt purchaser.133 Accordingly,
interpretation of the FDCPA in the wake of Henson v. Santander, as
applied to debt purchasers, would have to come from federal district
and appellate courts. This “solution” has one crucial practical
implication: more confusion in the search for clarity.
If Congress and the CFPB defer to district and appellate courts, the
answer will likely yield results that return debt collection to the same
position it occupied before Henson v. Santander when the debate
over mutual exclusivity created a circuit split.134 Henson v. Santander
virtually eliminated the inquiry into the defaulted status of a debt for
130. Stipulated Final Judgment & Order at 6, CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., 114 F.
Supp. 3d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (No. 1:14-cv-02211-AT).
131. Id. at 7. The Consent Order in the Hanna case also imposed requirements on individual attorneys
acting for the law firm. Id. at 7–9.
132. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725; see discussion supra Part I.C.
133. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725.
134. See generally Cuaresma et al., supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that the FDCPA does not address
instances when an entity meets the statutory standards for both a creditor and a debt collector, creating a
circuit split on how to classify purchasers of “nonperforming or defaulted accounts”).
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purposes of determining an entity’s role in debt collection.135 Thus,
district and appellate courts are no longer bound by their precedents
regarding mutual exclusivity and are free to decide however they
choose whether a debt purchaser’s principal business purpose is debt
collection.
The potential that circuits will answer this question in different
ways makes it plausible that a court in one circuit would determine a
debt purchaser’s principal business purpose to be debt collection,
whereas a court in a different circuit would determine that the same
debt purchaser’s principal business purpose is something other than
debt collection. This creates an inconsistency where a given debt
purchaser, like Midland Credit Management, could be subject to the
FDCPA in “Circuit A,” but exempt from it in “Circuit B.”136
Consequently, the remedies provided by the FDCPA would be
available to a harmed consumer in Circuit A but not available to a
harmed consumer in Circuit B.
CONCLUSION
Henson v. Santander seemingly exempted a significant portion of
the debt collection industry from the reach of the FDCPA.137 A debt
purchaser is not a debt collector because it owns the debts it is
attempting to collect instead of owing it to another entity.138
However, the Supreme Court decision did not address whether a debt
purchaser collecting on debts that it owns qualifies as a debt collector
if its principal business purpose is the collection of debt.139
The presence of debt purchasers in the debt collection industry has
drastically increased in recent years, leaving millions of American

135. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721 (“Neither does [the statute’s] language appear to suggest that we
should care how a debt owner came to be a debt owner—whether the owner originated the debt or came
by it only through a later purchase.”).
136. See ENCORE CAPITAL GRP., supra note 77 and accompanying text.
137. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721–22.
138. Id. at 1724.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012); Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725.
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debtors subject to demands for payment.140 With such a large group
of entities exempt from the FDCPA, millions of American debtors
are without a definite remedy if they feel harmed by a debt purchaser.
First, Congress should amend the FDCPA to eliminate the
principal business prong from the section defining a debt collector.141
Second, Congress should enact a law that imposes consequences on
debt purchasers if they fail to verify certain data points about each
debt within a portfolio at the time of acquisition. The proposed
changes will provide some reassurance to debtors that debt
purchasers are contacting them about legitimate debts while
simultaneously improving the efficiency of collection by debt
purchasers. Many questions exist, but it is quite certain that the
Supreme Court does not wish to address this topic in the near
future.142 Without solutions from Congress and the CFPB, the lower
courts are sure to resurrect the circuit split in a new form, leaving
millions of American consumers seeking a remedy for their harm in
legal purgatory.

140. HOBBS ET AL., supra note 119, at 13. In the ten years between 1993 and 2004, the amount of
consumer debt sold to debt purchasers increased from an estimated $660 million to $57 billion. Id. The
face value of the purchased debts was $110 billion. Id.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
142. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1725.

Published by Reading Room,

27

